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Abstract 
 
The paper uses simple event study methodology to look at whether disclosures of 
financial distress in terms of profit warning announcements and suspension notices impact on 
the market price of the shares of publicly listed New Zealand firms and examines the 
correlation between the behaviour of share prices and the firm’s corresponding Z score, which 
is indicative of the severity of financial distress. Using a sample of 71 distressed and matching 
control firms, the results are generally in support of prior literature but also highlight the 
complexity of the nature of financial distress prediction. The results also question the efficacy 
of the required disclosures on the NZX as timely or accurate identifiers of distress. 
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1.  Introduction 
Corporate financial distress is an interesting and much examined area within finance research 
due to the impact it has on organisations, stakeholders and ultimately, society. Financial 
distress is especially relevant as we move on from the global financial crisis, the ensuing 
recession and sovereign debt crises. Currently we are seeing successful firms recovering and 
unsuccessful firms taken over, delisted and disappearing. Now more than ever, there is a need 
to consider means of identifying financial distress, and better understand the pathways of such 
phenomena. 
 
The paper investigates whether the disclosure of financial distress has a clearly negative 
impact on the market value of the shares of listed New Zealand companies. Specifically it 
looks at the effect of two types of disclosure. The first of these is the notification of financial 
poor health that a listed firm makes to its investors through its stock exchange, in the form of 
a profit warning or a suspension of trading notification.  The second is the release of 
information in company financial reports which provides inputs for computing an Altman’s Z 
score, which investors might use to judge the financial health of a firm.  The study will use 
this information to run an event study in a New Zealand context. Therefore only companies in 
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the NZX historic database, the NZX Deep Archive, will be considered.  The intended 
contribution is two-fold. It will first provide some insight into the disclosure practices of New 
Zealand firms experiencing financial distress. Second, it could also help the NZX gauge the 
effectiveness of its disclosure requirements in aiding investors’ decision-making.  We argue 
that currently that formal disclosures of profit warnings and suspensions are at best noisy 
indicators of severe financial distress. 
In the event of a corporate failure, the shareholders are last in line, behind all the other 
stakeholders, to get invested capital back. Thus their need for timely and accurate indications 
on the wellbeing of their investments is crucial (Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2007). The role of 
disclosures is, in principle, to provide timely information to avert the mispricing of stock by 
traders who would otherwise remain uninformed; and reduce the cost of capital for firms in 
general through the reduction of information risk (Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Graham, Harvey, 
& Rajgopal, 2005; Healy & Palepu, 2001). This is particularly the case if companies are 
anticipating capital undertakings such as the issue of new shares, or mergers and acquisitions 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001).  However, management and stakeholders may have conflicting 
views on the provision of disclosure and this asymmetry in desired disclosure levels is likely 
to be greater when managers perceive that their firm has, for whatever reason, ceased to be 
profitable.  The problem for the investor is that it is difficult to tell a healthy firm from an 
unhealthy one in the absence of information.  It has been the role of stock exchange 
regulations to try to reduce this asymmetry.  Prior to the introduction of the ASX Principles 
and the ASX Listing Rules, Collett and Hrasky (2005) argues that companies made very little 
corporate disclosures. They cite a survey by Sauer (1996) indicating that 43% of the 
companies on the ASX 100 did not make specific corporate governance disclosures in the 
early 1990s. Such uncertainty in the market hinders efficiency and rational investors 
prudently react by undervaluing ‘good’ investments, but at the same time overvaluing ‘bad’ 
investments (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
Most of the studies dealing with the willingness of companies to provide disclosures 
concern themselves with firms that are assumed to be stable or growing (Daily, Dalton, & 
Cannella Jr, 2003).  A much smaller body of research deals with the disclosures of financially 
distressed firms.  The bulk of this relates to distress disclosures in the United States.  
Elsewhere, Frino et al. (2007) used an event study to look at the impact of bankruptcy 
announcements in Australia, and Eng and Mak (2003) looked at disclosure policies of 158 
firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange.  There is, however, a significant lack of 
research in the New Zealand context. Through the use of an event study, this paper seeks to 
provide insight into the effect of disclosures of financial distress on share prices of listed 
companies in the NZX. 
The paper will be laid out as follows: section two reviews prior literature on disclosure 
practices of firms experiencing financial distress. Section three looks at the formulation of the 
hypotheses and methodology. The data is discussed in section four, followed by the results in 
section five. The paper then closes with concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Previous Research 
 
This section covers the background as to what motivates firms to make distress-related 
disclosures at the time that they do.  It covers voluntary disclosure, timing, adequacy of 
disclosure, and the phenomenon of escape from disclosing at all by going dark. 
Holder-Webb & Cohen (2007) and Altman (1983) concur in the recognition of the 
overall impact of financial distress. However, there is no unanimity in the research record 
concerning the effect of timing of disclosures and the underlying motivations of corporations’ 
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tendency to provide disclosures. Moreover, despite a consensus that the losses to investors 
through uninformed decisions arising from non-disclosure are greater than those of the 
disclosure costs incurred by either management or the investors (Proimos, 2005), Healy and 
Palepu (2001) assert that regulated and mandatory disclosures usually allow management to 
pass the costs on to shareholders, thereby casting doubt over their supposed benefits. Further 
research within the disclosure practices of firms experiencing financial difficulties is therefore 
very valuable. 
But do firms actually provide voluntary disclosures?  Mandatory disclosures are 
generally little more than the release of the general purpose financial statements as required in 
stock exchange listing rules and specified in accounting standards backed by law. Voluntary 
disclosures are the market updates provided on as as-needed (by the firm) basis to investors 
via the exchange that the securities are listed on. The voluntary aspect of the disclosure is that 
the company can choose (to some extent) whether or not to disclose, and has control of its 
timing.  Security exchanges generally do not explicitly state the level of updated information 
firms must provide, but that updates must be provided when the information content is 
material. Typically, these updates include incidences of material misstatements and 
accounting adjustments, significant changes in shareholdings and governance structures, 
profit warnings and suspensions of trade and trading halts. 
A number of possible motivations for companies to provide voluntary disclosures 
have been suggested. Healy and Palepu (2001) believe that management engages in a constant 
struggle against shareholders for the balance of power. Shareholders have the ability to 
exercise voting rights to replace personnel in the event of a company’s poor performance. 
Management therefore has the incentive to provide disclosure to correct mispricing of shares 
and defensively explain poor performance. Graham et al, (2005) suggest, on the basis of 
surveys and interviews with Chief Financial Officers, the failure of directors to achieve 
projected earnings per share, is indicative of poor management, prompting shareholders to 
take remedial action. Voluntary disclosures could therefore be used to the managements’ own 
advantage; as a defensive mechanism or to signal their talent to the market. 
Voluntary disclosures can also serve to maintain good relationships with other 
stakeholders. Collett and Hrasky (2005), upon analysing 299 Australian annual reports for the 
year 1994, find that managers make disclosure decisions in an attempt to take advantage of 
more favourable terms from capital suppliers. They can also decrease costs for analysts, 
thereby increasing analysts’ attention and following in the firm (Graham et al., 2005). This is 
especially important now, given the increase in investment by, and activism of, institutional 
shareholders who generally have a superior background knowledge and influence over 
ordinary shareholders (Gillan & Starks, 2000). 
Voluntary disclosures also help overcome the underlying limitations of the general 
purpose financial statements.  These generally have significant time lags between releases, as 
they are, at their most frequent, quarterly, but in New Zealand tend to be published on an 
semi-annual basis.  In addition, the complexity of the terminology used, although in line with 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP), is usually such that investors’ ability 
to understand is somewhat impaired (Graham et al., 2005).  However, other factors causing 
managers to be reluctant to disclose information voluntarily should also be taken into 
consideration. Graham et al, (2005) discuss management’s fear of setting up a disclosure 
precedent (p.59) that will limit its future freedom of action by what it has disclosed and 
perhaps even expose the firm to a potential litigation liability. 
Cost of disclosures is another important consideration. Chandra and Greenball (1978) 
suggest that the cost of data collection may deter management from disclosing more than it is 
legally obliged to. However, the authors also counter-argue that, because such information is 
generally on hand, the marginal costs incurred by management should not be substantial. 
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Indirect costs, such as proprietary, agency and political costs may also arise from the decision 
to voluntarily disclose (Graham et al., 2005). Proprietary costs are incurred as a firm’s 
competitive position is compromised. Agency costs arise if management, by self-serving 
actions, reduces the return on investment to shareholders or other stakeholders.  Political costs 
are incurred when regulators use the disclosures to the company’s detriment (Graham et al., 
2005). However, Chandra and Greenball (1978) argue that such information is usually readily 
available in the market from other sources such as trade publications and stakeholders’ 
networking. Moreover, they believe that, as a result of the increasing sophistication of 
shareholders partly attributable to the increasing role played by institutions, investors’ 
understanding of financial information should no longer be a valid barrier to disclosure.  
In sum, although there is a trade-off, the benefits of voluntary disclosures arguably 
outweigh the costs. This trade-off creates an optimal disclosure level for the firm.  This is 
usually a partial disclosure, as companies understand that excessive disclosure is just as costly 
as no disclosure (Core, 2001).  
There are two main arguments regarding whether firms voluntarily disclose 
unfavourable information and if the disclosure is on a timely basis. The first assumes that 
firms will not withhold unfavourable news; the other holds that it will be withheld. The 
determining factor in the decision is the perceived reaction that is likely from the market 
(Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009), and the resulting effects on the firm’s share prices 
(Trueman, 1986). 
The first argument implies that, regardless of the resulting effect on share prices, firms 
will provide timely disclosure of unfavourable news. Timely disclosure of both good and bad 
news indicates that management has the ability to anticipate future changes in the firm, thus 
increasing their reputation and, downstream, their compensation. On the other hand, lack of 
disclosure leads the market to think that the firm has bad news. Fear of being punished in the 
stock market for bad news prompts management to provide timely disclosures (Trueman, 
1986). However, real bad news is usually anticipated by investors and their expectations are 
impounded into share prices long before the date of its formal disclosure (Frino et al., 2007; 
Morris, 1997). Bad news therefore should not be ‘new’ news to investors and thus there is no 
reason for disclosures of bad news to be delayed. Frost (1997) agrees with this claim stating 
that, based on the 81 firms he studied, distressed firms were open about disclosure of their 
negative news. The rationale is that, if the market is efficient, the signs of impending distress 
will clearly discernible to investors.  Investors, for example, will pick up the cues implied in a 
decrease or omission of dividends (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990). More importantly, bad 
news often sounds ‘better’ coming from the firms themselves in a timely manner (Frost, 
1997). Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) found that 76.8% of their respondents 
considered that timely disclosures not only sounded better, but also reduced a firm’s litigation 
risk. Moreover, managers who would withhold negative announcements in the hope that the 
situation would turn around first are in the minority (Graham et al., 2005). Timely disclosure 
is also a chance for management to explain poor performance to prevent shareholders holding 
management responsible and taking corrective action (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Frino et al. (2007) examine the effects of bankruptcy announcements on 78 companies 
listed on the ASX. They find that firms that subsequently fail experience declining share 
prices as early as 425 days before the disclosure date (p.722). Their results fit with Skinner 
(1994), who found that, in 25 percent of cases of negative earnings surprises in his NASDAQ 
sample, prices had already adjusted via investors’ informed decision making. Skinner also 
argued that management has an incentive to disclose large negative earnings surprises in a 
timely manner to minimise potential litigation costs. However, there is a trade off in terms of 
pricklier investor relations sooner.  
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With respect to the threat of litigation, there are conflicting views on how it influences 
an organisation’s disclosure decisions and hence its perceived impact on share prices. 
Litigation is costly in terms of fees, damage to reputation and the inefficient use of 
management’s time (Field, Lowry, & Shu, 2005).  Litigation becomes especially relevant for 
distressed firms as the risk of litigation increases when earnings turn out to be lower than 
investors’ expectations (Field et al., 2005; Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
However, there are conflicting views regarding disclosure motives relating to 
litigation.  On the one hand, legal action against firms for inappropriate and untimely 
disclosure may be seen as an incentive to disclose (Field et al., 2005; Graham et al., 2005; 
Healy & Palepu, 2001; Kothari et al., 2009). Field et al, (2005) suggest that timely disclosure 
can help deflect shareholders’ claims of improper management and negligence, as 
management has fulfilled its duty with respect to disclosures. The risk of litigation also 
decreases as the timeframe in which the share price was mispriced, decreases.  The opposite 
view is taken by Graham et al, (2005) and Healy and Palepu (2001).  They argue that the fear 
of setting a disclosure precedent may reduce the incentive to provide forward-looking 
disclosures. This is because legal liabilities may result if management fails to achieve what 
they disclosed they would do. Existing research is ambiguous.  Early disclosures have, in 
some cases, deterred litigation and mitigated liabilities, but in others have failed to achieve 
either. 
Overall, disclosures that are made in advance, and on a timely basis are most likely 
issued by firms with high litigation risk to reduce the potential negative impacts on the firm. 
The choice of disclosure is therefore influenced by the industry the company is in, and 
whether or not it has historically provided disclosures (Field et al., 2005). However, from 
their sample of law suits in the United States between 1996 and 2006, the authors confirmed 
that, regardless of litigation risk-source, firms with a greater market capitalisation generally 
have a greater chance of facing litigation.  
Given the adverse impact on share prices, management has incentive to withhold the 
disclosure of unfavourable news (Kothari et al., 2009). Management’s self interest, whether 
directly through compensation or indirectly through ownership schemes, affects both the 
extent and integrity of disclosures (Donoher, Reed, & Storrud-Barnes, 2007; Kothari et al., 
2009). Management may even go as far as using somewhat creative means that have the effect 
of distorting earnings and depressing long term prospects to avoid disclosure (Graham et al., 
2005; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2007). The incidence of information asymmetry provides 
opportunities for management to withhold disclosure; however this ability to delay bad news 
has somewhat diminished through the introduction of continuous disclosure regulations in the 
United States (Kothari et al., 2009).  New Zealand has similar disclosure requirements set out 
by the Securities Market Act (1988) and the NZX listing rules (New Zealand Stock Exchange, 
2009). However lax policing by the Securities Commissions, which has been suspected both 
internationally and domestically (Mackay, 2010; McConvill, 2006; Proimos, 2005), is likely 
to reduce the extent of complete and timely disclosures, though this is, as yet, unproven. 
Research into the New Zealand context is therefore very valuable. 
Many authors argue that management therefore elects to withhold unfavourable news 
(Graham et al., 2005; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2007; Kothari et al., 2009; Lurie & Pastena, 
1975; Whittred & Zimmer, 1984).  Lurie and Pastena discovered that there is a significant 
timing difference between the disclosure of favourable and unfavourable news, with only 
22% of unfavourable news reported early in the fiscal year and most in the 12th (i.e. last) 
month. Lurie and Pastena’s respondents believed that this is due to the relatively more 
stringent scrutiny during the close of the company year and that management controls 
naturally hamper the flow of information. However, this argument is weak, considering that 
those same management controls do not affect the prompt disclosure of favourable news. 
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Moreover, as this study was conducted in 1975, it may not be as relevant 35 years on. This 
study seeks to fill this gap by providing current insight on the disclosures in the New Zealand 
context. 
The firms described as most likely to provide inadequate disclosures are those that are 
generally less profitable, as they want to hide the reasons they are not performing (Singhvi & 
Desai, 1971). Firms with relatively poor prospects and performance usually do not disclose 
the full extent of their relative position in the market (Penman, 1980) as this increases 
uncertainty, which is detrimental to their relatively higher default and bankruptcy risk 
(Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2007). Moreover, Whittred and Zimmer (984) assert that distressed 
companies usually have longer time lags between the releases of their general purpose 
financial statements.  However, these authors only studied 53 failed firms and matching 
control groups that were listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange. This is restrictive and reduces 
the strength of their claims. Additionally, their definition of “distress” includes only firms that 
went through receivership when there are many alternatives for distressed firms, ranging from 
liquidation, bankruptcy to restructuring (Ball & Foster, 1982; Coats & Fant, 1993; Whittred & 
Zimmer, 1984). Similarly, Singhvi and Desai (1971) only examined 55 annual reports, and as 
the research was conducted nearly four decades ago, the relevance of their findings is also 
brought into question. 
On the whole, bad news therefore should not be ‘new’ news to investors and thus there 
is no reason for disclosures of bad news to be delayed. However, Holder-Webb and Cohen 
(2007) are of the view that there is a discrepancy between moral and economic motivations to 
disclose information, and that management’s self interest may allow the latter to override the 
former. Moreover, the ability of voluntary disclosures to achieve the intended effects is 
largely dependent on the perceived credibility of disclosures, which declines with the 
financial health of the company (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
There are also incentives to bypass disclosure completely, withdraw from the SEC (in 
the US) and “go dark” (Leuz, Triantis, & Wang, 2008 p. 182). These are firms that are still 
publicly trading, but no longer follow rigorous disclosure requirements as they have chosen to 
delist from the relevant securities exchange (Coles, 2008; Marosi & Massoud, 2009). This 
phenomenon is more common in the United States, especially after the enactment of stringent 
legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, following many high-profile corporate collapses 
(Coles, 2008; Leuz et al., 2008; Marosi & Massoud, 2009). There is a trade-off in such 
decisions. Leuz et al, (2008) and Marosi and Massoud (2009) believe that, as the firms who 
usually resort to such measures are generally small, poor performing and are under a great 
deal of stress, the cost savings achieved from not having to comply with the SEC disclosure 
rules justifies this decision. On the other hand, Coles (2008) believes that the benefits do not 
justify the costs, as the firms will experience a significant decrease in growth opportunities. 
However, the authors are in agreement that the market’s perception of such a move is 
generally negative, in that even if it is made for some legitimate reason, the interpretation will 
be that management is looking after its personal agenda. 
There is no evidence that this phenomenon is occurring yet in New Zealand. However, 
with advent of the continuous disclosure regime and the adoption of New Zealand 
International Financial Reporting Standards (NZICA, 2007) on top of the existing 
requirements of the Financial Reporting Act 1993 and the Companies Act 1993 (Yeoh, 2005), 
such a practice may well occur in the future. 
Overall, the bulk of the research is related to the business context of the United States, 
which does not consider New Zealand’s business environment. This represents a significant 
research gap, and this paper seeks to address it. 
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3.  Hypotheses and Methodology 
 
The first main research question addressed by the paper is: What is the impact of disclosures 
of financial distress on the market value of shares of publicly-listed New Zealand firms?  The 
second relates to the apparent disclosures of distress as noisy indicators: To what extent are 
disclosures of financial distress meaningful indicators of meaningful distress? 
An event study is the most commonly used method to analyse the effect of company-
specific phenomena on equity markets.  As this is a preliminary study, the methodology and 
diagnostics are kept as simple as possible.  Daily trading returns Rjt (for any company j for 
day t) are collected in natural log form along with log-form returns on the market RMt.  A 
return expectation is generated by performing the following simple OLS regression 
employing these two variables on a 250-day estimation period.  
 
jt MtR Rα β ε= + +  (Equation 1) 
 
The expectation is then forecasted forward into the test period, and into the event 
window in particular.  An abnormal return is calculated for each day of interest by subtracting 
the forecasted return and cumulative abnormal returns are generated additively from these: 
 
( )jt jt MtAR R Rα β= − +  (Equation 2) 
1
1 N
j jt
t
CAR AR
N =
= ∑
 (Equation 3) 
 
For each financial distress disclosure event, the estimation period is initially set at 250 
days as it is just short of one year of trading.  Initially, the estimation period is set 
immediately prior to a 21-day test period in which the eleventh day is the day of the 
disclosure.  However, for examining the effects of financial distress prior to the date of 
disclosure, we use a much earlier estimation period and switch to using weekly data.  In this 
instance, the estimation period trading ends three years before the date of disclosure 
We turn now to the basic hypotheses, which are all framed in the null form.  Due to 
the availability of information from a wide variety of communication sources, investors 
usually anticipate such news and therefore have already discounted their perceived value of 
the firm (Frino et al., 2007; Morris, 1997). Therefore share prices already reflect these events, 
so on the day of disclosure, there should be no significant impact.  
 
H1: Abnormal returns on the day of a distress disclosure to the NZX are not 
significant, measurable at the 5% level of a Type I error. 
 
In addition, shareholders’ informed decision-making has long term impacts on share 
prices. In Frino et al. (2007) shareholders were found to experience losses from 425 days 
prior to the actual bankruptcy announcement. On that basis, share prices should gradually 
decline, as different shareholders start to adjust the perceived value of their investment. 
 
H2: Share returns, measured as weekly cumulative abnormal returns, do not 
decline in the year(s) before a distress disclosure, measurable at the 5% level 
of a Type I error. 
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With respect to H2, investors generally will retire their investment in distressed firms 
well before an official announcement by the company. The test period for examining the 
hypothesis therefore includes up to three years prior to the disclosure date, to capture the 
effects of the investors who have pulled out earlier.   The estimation period here consists of 51 
weeks of weekly trading data prior to the 157th week before the date of distress disclosure. 
This is then projected onto t-157 WKS (approximately 3 years beforehand) until t52 WKS 
(approximately one year after disclosure date).  
We turn now to the third hypothesis.  There is no universally accepted definition of 
financial distress (Ball & Foster, 1982), but numerous studies support the use of Altman’s Z 
index (Coats & Fant, 1993; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2007; Piotroski, 2000, among others).  
This is a weighted index:  
 
1 2 3 4 51.2 1.4 3.3 .06 .999Z X X X X X= + + + +  (Equation 4) 
 
 
In Equation 4, (Altman, 1968, 1983)1
Altman’s Z index is a linear analysis technique that determines a firm’s classification 
based on dichotomous measures (financially distressed or non-distressed).  When the 
computed value of Z is greater than 2.99, a firm is deemed not to be financially distressed, 
while it is considered to be so when the Z is less than 1.81.  Altman (1983 p.120) calls the 
interval between these two values (1.81 < Z < 2.99) the “Zone of ignorance” in which the 
firm’s financial health is neither clearly sound nor unsound.  As firms release information in 
their financial statements that allows informed investors to calculate a Z value, it is reasonable 
to expect that they do so.  It is therefore also reasonable to expect that a negative score will 
generally indicate unfavourable share return performance. 
 X1 is the ratio Working capital/total assets, 
while X2 is the ratio of Retained earnings/total assets, X3 Earnings before interest and 
taxes/total assets, X4 Market value equity/book values of total liabilities, and X5 is Sales/total 
assets. 
 
H3: There is no significant relationship between share price behaviour and the 
magnitude of Altman’s Z statistic, measurable by the Kruskal-Wallis Test. 
 
We will use the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test, for which purpose, the abnormal 
returns associated with distress disclosures will be sorted into the three Z-score categories for 
three sets of tests.  Specifically, the test will be performed on the abnormal returns on day t0 in 
the first set.  In the second set, the test will be performed on a weekly cumulative abnormal 
return cumulated over the year prior to the event date; and in the third, the test will be run on 
a weekly cumulative abnormal return cumulated over the year ending one year prior to the 
event date.  For these abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns, the estimation 
periods are as given for testing hypotheses H1 and H2 above.  
Other researchers have generally cited distress disclosures of greater severity than is 
the case in the study. For example, Altman (1968) and Frino et al. (2007) included only 
bankrupt firms within their distressed samples.  However, this study observes all instances of 
distress disclosure available in New Zealand.  Therefore, the indicators of distress provided to 
the stock exchange and the public (usually in the form of profit warnings, suspension of trades 
and material misstatements) may well be too noisy to be efficient and effective measures of 
financial distress.  On the other hand, disclosures are all we have in advance (whether timely 
                                                 
1  The actual version of the Z-score specified here is equivalent to Altman’s (1968) specification and is explained 
by Altman (2000), p.12. 
9 
 
or not) and the absolute fact of a bankruptcy is only known with certainty, retrospectively.  
No formal hypothesis is posited to test this noisiness assertion.  However, the evidence 
accumulated in testing the existing three hypotheses provides ample information for 
addressing the noisy indicator phenomenon. 
 
 
 4. Data 
 
Share price and distress announcement information was obtained from the NZX Deep 
Archive (January 1990 – May 2010).  In total, there were 426 companies in the archive. Since 
there is no universal measure of ‘financial distress’ as different studies have different criteria, 
(Ball & Foster, 1982) we define the advent of distress in terms of three diagnostics:  profit 
warning announcements, a suspension of trade of their securities on the NZX or incidences of 
material restatements in the company’s financial statements. To be included in the sample, a 
“distressed” company must first have made one of these distress-related announcements and 
its announcement files and price history information must be on the database.  The earliest 
Deep Archive price histories date from January 1990 onward.  A sample of 72 companies 
meeting the above definition was collected.  However, one company lacked available share 
price data, bringing the sample down to 71 companies. Of these, 48 companies announced a 
profit warning and the remaining 23 experienced a suspension of trading.  The distribution 
across time of the companies is provided in figure 1, which shows the location of the test 
periods.  The year in which a company disclosed its distress will be the final year of the given 
span for each point along the horizontal axis. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of the Testing Period of the Distressed Sample 
 
 
 
A matching sample of 71 control companies consists of NZX-listed firms that neither 
made profit warning announcements nor were suspended from trade. In choosing the control 
firms, care was taken to ensure that they were similar, or as close to the distressed company as 
possible. Share price information for the same time period was also examined. However, 
given New Zealand’s small number of publicly-listed companies, this could not always be the 
case. Each company has been categorised into a sector by the NZX. In the first incidence, a 
control company was chosen within the same sector. In cases where a control company could 
not be identified within the same sector, a company with similar business activity with 
relevant share price information was selected. 
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The event day of a control company, t0, was set on the date the corresponding 
distressed company released its profit warning or was suspended from trade. Hence the 
matched pairs had matched estimation and test periods.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Market Capitalisation on t0 ($000)  
 Distressed Control 
Mean 554,470 2,438,980 
Medium 41,310 49,360 
Standard Deviation 2,154,665 13,611,554 
 Z Score on t0  
 Distressed Control 
Mean -0.76756992 1.009025561 
Median 1.408902911 1.080461941 
Standard Deviation 11.00617654 3.652570054 
Z<1.81 = Financially distressed, most likely to face bankruptcy 
1.81<Z<2.99 = Less likely to face bankruptcy but subject to high probability of incorrect classification  
Z>2.99 = Not financially distressed, clearly not bankrupt  
 Data Summary (Number of firms)  
Sector Distressed Control 
Finance and Others 5 7 
Consumers 10 7 
Transport 3 1 
NZAX 13 11 
Food and Beverage 2 4 
Media an Communication 2 4 
Textile & Apparel 3 1 
Mining 1 1 
Tourism 1 2 
Energy Processing 3 5 
Port 1 3 
Agriculture and Fisheries 5 4 
Overseas 8 4 
Property 1 1 
Intermediate and Durables 6 6 
Investment 7 6 
Forestry & Forest products - 1 
Building Materials & Construction - 3 
Total 71 71 
Distress Criteria Distressed Control  
Profit Warning 48  
Suspension of Trade 23  
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As the analysis progressed, it became clear that incidence of profit warnings and 
suspensions of trade were inadequate indicators of financial distress. This may have been 
because every company may experience financial turbulence to some extent in its lifetime.  It 
is also of interest that the mean and median Z-scores of the control firms fall into the risk of 
distress category; but why this should be so is an issue that falls outside the scope of this 
study. 
When the original sample of 71 companies was further filtered to include only those 
that have ceased to be in operation, there were only eight bona fide distressed companies: six 
in receivership and two in either voluntary or involuntary liquidation.  That left a question 
hanging over the nature and effect of the other 63 distress proxy announcements. 
Information concerning the five ratios for the Altman’s Z score is collected through 
the “Annual Report Financials” section of each company in the NZX Deep Archive.2
Table 2 shows the number of firms in the distressed and control samples, and the 
subsequent subsamples with complete Z score information.  The number of control companies 
is reduced by there not being data available for 30 of them, while 18 of the distressed firms 
are dropped for the same reason. 
 For the 
fourth ratio, market value equity/book values of total liabilities, the “last” share price on the 
closing date of the company’s year is used.  In cases where the “last” price is unavailable, the 
“bid” price is used, since it represents what investors are willing to pay and, as such, is similar 
to the accounting concept of fair value, in which there is a hierarchy of determining the value 
of an asset or liability. In the first instance, the “last price” represents level one of the 
hierarchy, the quoted price of an active market. The “bid price” represents the second level of 
the hierarchy, in which the quoted price of an inactive market is sought, as there was no 
trading of the firm’s share on that day (NZICA, 2009). 
 
Table 2: Firms in the Distressed and Control Samples for the Z Score Analysis 
 
 Distressed Control 
Full Sample 53 41 
Profit Warning 44 26 
Suspension 9 15 
‘Bona Fide’ Distressed 2 - 
 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1. Results concerning H1 
H1 states that share returns do not significantly drop on the day of a distress disclosure to the 
NZX, measurable at the 5 percent level of a Type I error. To be able to reject H1, there must 
be significant negative ARt0 on the day of disclosure.  
 
  
                                                 
2 Annual rather than semi-annual reports were used in the study.  With respect to the earlier years of the sample, 
use of semi-annual data would have entailed more instances of inaccessibility of data. 
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Table 3: Abnormal Returns of Full Sample of Distressed and Control Companies  
 Distressed Companies (t = days from distress disclosure)   
ARt -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean 0.0084 -0.0085 0.0033 0.0242 0.0299 0.0064 -0.0038 0.0010 
Median  -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0007 0 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0003 
Max  0.4671 0.0859 0.4628 1.0837 0.4695 0.2565 0.0417 0.1055 
Min  -0.1885 -0.3848 -0.2200 -0.1640 -0.2257 -0.2609 -0.1026 -0.1269 
% > 0 43.66% 38.03% 36.62% 43.66% 49.30% 42.25% 38.57% 42.86% 
P value 0.3792 0.2068 0.7550 0.1626 0.0153** 0.4244 0.1755 0.7441 
 Control Companies (t = days from distress disclosure)   
ARt -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean 0.0069 -0.0075 0.0015 -0.0049 -0.0009 9.56E-05 -0.0004 -0.0009 
Median  5.22E-05 -0.0016 0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 -2.3E-05 
Max 0.5052 0.0483 0.0620 0.1967 0.3231 0.0928 0.1123 0.0743 
Min  -0.0774 -0.1861 -0.0461 -0.0702 -0.1689 -0.0859 -0.1437 -0.15075 
% > 0 50.70 32.39 54.93 33.80 42.25 47.89 44.29 48.57 
P value 0.3714 0.0300** 0.4213 0.1977 0.8789 0.9684 0.8937 0.7555 
** Significant at the 5 percent level of a Type I error 
Both groups had sufficient information for all 71 companies in the sample up until two day the after the disclosure, where 
information was only available for 70 out of the 71 companies in the sample.  
 
Table 3 compares the ARt0 of the 71 companies in the original distressed sample and 
their corresponding control companies. It shows a significant reaction at the 5 percent level on 
the day of disclosure t0, indicative by the p-value of 0.0153. However, upon closer inspection, 
this significant reaction may be due to distortions caused by some of the ARt0 in the sample. 
The mean ARt0 is 0.0299, which is greater than the median of 0. There is also a large 
difference between the maximum and minimum ARt0, which tend to suggest that the data is 
not normally distributed.  The data is indeed skewed towards the left hand (negative) side as 
only 49.30 percent of the ARt0 in the sample was positive. On the other hand, there appears to 
be no reaction in the market on t0 for control firms, as the p-value is at 0.8789. 
Overall, the mean reaction in the market is driven by a small number of firms with 
large positive ARt0 such as ICP Biotechnology Ltd, Postie Plus Group Ltd, Tower Ltd, VTL 
Group Ltd and POD Ltd. There are several explanations for this.  The first is that a small rise 
in a very low share price in the presence of a negative movement in the market as a whole 
may yield a relatively large abnormal return.  This is the case illustrated by ICP 
Biotechnology Ltd and VTL Group Ltd.  The second possibility is illustrated by Tower Ltd, a 
large and reputable insurance company with a large following of analysts by New Zealand 
standards, whose profit warning, as explained shortly, has been dismissed by investors in the 
presence of further information. The relative inadequacy of profit warnings and suspension 
notices as identifiers of serious financial distress is highlighted by the fact that, of the 71 
companies included in the full distressed sample; only 8 were ultimately put into liquidation 
or receivership and have ceased trading. 
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Table 4: Abnormal Returns sorted by the Suspension of Trade Criterion 
                   Distressed Company   
ARt -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean 0.0544 -0.0185 0.0304 0.0782 -0.0105 -0.0029 0.0008 0.0044 
Median  0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -1.9E-05 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0008 -0.0002 
Max  0.4733 0.1247 0.4694 1.0959 0.0805 0.0048 0.0185 0.0767 
Min  -0.1828 -0.3920 -0.2228 -0.1615 -0.2230 -0.0285 -0.0101 -0.0078 
%> 0 52.17 43.48 43.48 47.83 43.48 43.48 54.55 45.45 
P value 0.1200 0.3526 0.3125 0.1483 0.3517 0.0897* 0.5624 0.2362 
                        Control Company     
ARt -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean 0.0134 -0.0028 0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0094 0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0023 
Median -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0032 0.0010 -0.0004 0.0004 
Max  0.5052 0.0483 0.0524 0.0169 0.03657 0.0552 0.04937 0.0610 
Min  -0.0774 -0.0750 -0.0461 -0.0665 -0.0719 -0.0860 -0.0713 -0.1507 
% > 0 45.83 37.50 54.17 50.00 25.00 54.17 43.48 56.52 
P value 0.5458 0.5727 0.9197 0.2980 0.06713* 0.8313 0.64567 0.7666 
* Significant at the 10 percent level of a Type I error 
Both groups had sufficient information for all 23 companies in the sample up until two days after the disclosure, where 
information was only available for 22 out of the 23 companies in the sample.  
 
Table 4 presents the abnormal performance record of the 23 firms experiencing a 
suspension of trade from the NZX and their matches.  In terms of the distressed sample, there 
is no significant market reaction at the 5 percent level as the p-value for t0 is 0.3517.  This 
tends to suggest that investors do not react negatively to companies with a suspension of trade. 
This is most likely due to the fact that the NZX will only suspend a listed company from 
trading for significant breaches of their listing rules, and will have given forward notice of its 
intention to do so.  Therefore investors will have had time to adjust their perceptions of the 
firm’s value. The fact that there is a reduction in the size of abnormal returns following the 
announcement suggests that even unsophisticated investors consider the firm to be valued 
correctly as of the time of the announcement.  This finding is in line with those of Frino et al 
(2007) who found that their ASX-listed firms, on average, recorded 1.3 percent gain on the 
day of the announcement (and 1.2 percent the previous day), following a 424-day trend of 
falling value.  Also both the mean and median ARt0 were negative; and less than 50 percent of 
the ARt0 values in the sample were positive. This is in line with our expectations.  
On the other hand, unlike the case of the “distressed” firms, the mean abnormal 
returns of the 23 control firms do not systematically alter in magnitude following day t0.  
Given that nothing has happened for them, on average, this is to be expected. However, these 
companies furnish a weakly significant negative reaction, with a p-value of 0.0671. This is 
unexpected as we would expect them to furnish tiny, insignificant abnormal returns. This 
reaction is caused by two firms in particular, Comvita Limited and Sealegs Corporation 
Limited, which yielded relatively large negative ARt0 values and thus have depressed the mean 
(-0.0094) for the control firms relative to their median (-0.0032). In a rising market, we would 
also expect a greater proportion of positive ARt0 values for the control group. However with 
only 25 percent of the ARt0 being positive, it is clear there is a negative skew in the 
distribution of abnormal returns for these firms.  This may reflect the impact of economic 
hard times New Zealand experienced in the early 1990s lingering from the 1987 Crash and 
the effects of the Global Economic Crisis in the data from 2007 onward.  The point that is 
salient, however, is that for suspensions, there is no appreciable distinction on day t0 between 
“distressed” firms and control firms in magnitude with the expected sign. 
Similarly, Table 5 shows the ARt0 results of the 48 firms which issued a profit warning.  
There is a significant reaction in the market at the 1 percent level, with the p-value of 0.0025. 
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However, contrary to our expectations, the mean of the ARt0 in the 48 companies in the 
distressed sample is positive, where negative ARt0 are usually expected of companies upon the 
disclosure of a negative profit outlook.  However, the median is negative, as expected, and 
very small (-3.9E-06).  This tiny magnitude is again indicative of an absence of meaningful 
news content in the profit warning announcement.  The huge difference between mean and 
median values can be traced to the effect of 5 outlier firms which may have tempered their 
warnings by simultaneously announcing encouraging news of some sort.  For instance, in the 
case of Tower Ltd, the profit warning was announced in conjunction with a plan to improve 
the firm’s finances by raising $200 million in new debt. 
 
Table 5: Abnormal Returns sorted by the Profit Warning Criterion 
 
** Significant at the 5 percent level of a Type I error 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level of a Type I error 
Both the distressed and control samples had sufficient information for all 48 companies in the sample for the entire testing 
period.  
 
However, 62.50 percent of the ARt0 values for “distressed” companies were positive.  
With respect to the 48 control companies, there are no significant reactions; and both 
the mean and median are positive. This result supports our prior expectations for control 
companies. 
Table 6 eliminates the effects of the above five companies, bringing the sample down 
to 43. The mean and median ARt0 continue to be positive and significant at the one percent 
level for the distressed companies. However, they have decreased by 68.85% and 33.29% 
respectively, indicating that the five companies were key drivers of the unexpected magnitude 
of ARt0 back in Table 4. However, the Table 6 result still highlights the inadequacy of profit 
warning as a classification, as it is too broad to capture only severe cases of financial distress. 
 
  
   Distressed Company    
ARt -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Mean 0.0039 -0.0049 0.0042 0.0509 0.0134 -0.0011 0.0054 0.0030 
Median 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0013 -3.9E-06 0 0.0013 -0.0008 
Max 0.0906 0.0404 0.11069 0.4713 0.2576 0.0533 0.1064 0.05977 
Min -0.0930 -0.1848 -0.0289 -0.0079 -0.1075 -0.1033 -0.0337 -0.0556 
% > 0 52.08% 52.08% 41.67% 62.50% 45.83% 50.00% 64.58% 41.67% 
P value 0.2920 0.2920 0.1505 0.0025*** 0.15435 0.7726 0.0539 0.3199 
    Control Company    
ARt -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean) 0.0033 -0.0110 0.0015 -0.0055 0.0038 -0.0009 -7.4E-06 -0.0006 
Median 0.00013 -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0033 0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0006 
Max 0.1133 0.0146 0.0620 0.1967 0.3231 0.09287 0.1123 0.0743 
Min -0.0297 -0.1861 -0.0300 -0.0702 -0.1689 -0.0353 -0.1437 -0.0361 
% > 0 53.19% 29.79% 55.32% 25.53% 53.19% 44.68% 45.65% 43.48% 
P value 0.2943 0.0298** 0.5072 0.3095 0.6532 0.7251 0.9987 0.7771 
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Table 6: Abnormal Returns Sorted by Profit Warning Criterion (Reduced to 43 Firms) 
** Significant at the 5 percent level of a Type I error 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level of a Type I error 
Both the distressed and control samples had sufficient information for all 43 companies in the sample for the entire testing 
period. 
 
Although Tables 3 to 6 show a significant reaction on day t0, it is apparent that results 
have been driven by the distortions ascribable to individual companies and that there is clearly 
no strong evidence of a negative reaction in the market on the day of disclosure. Therefore, 
the hypothesis H1 cannot be rejected.  This corroborates Frino et al (2007). 
 
5.2.  Results concerning H2 
H2 states that share returns do not decline in the year or years preceding a distress disclosure, 
measurable in weekly CARs.  Figure 2 shows graphically, the average CAR from t-157 WKS (3 
years prior to distress disclosure) to t52 WKS (approximately one year following the disclosure 
date) for both the 71 distressed and 71 control companies in the original sample. What is 
expected is that the average CAR of the distressed firms will be generally lower than that of 
the control companies and that it will be declining over time, to reflect relatively poorer 
performance. 
The results are surprising in that the CARs for the distressed companies increase over 
time, to a point where it actually takes over the CARs of the control companies. Intuitively, 
we would expect growing negative CARs, if the market were to be reacting negatively to a 
distress disclosure impending on the horizon.  In part this is explained by the presence of 
firms such as Tower Ltd for which a profit warning has been a temporary step backward.  
However, it is also possible for a firm to appear to be doing very well until some poor 
investment decision by its management has rapidly unfolding disastrous results.  If so, 
cumulative abnormal returns would be expected to plunge in response to the distress 
disclosure.  The trajectory of the mean CAR suggests, however, that there are no firms like 
this in the sample.  However, in a non-quantitative professional journal article, Argenti (1977) 
provides some insight into the range of paths that firms might take into financial distress. 
 
  
   Distressed Company    
ARt -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Mean 0.0016 -0.0016 0.0012 0.0158 0.0193 -0.0003 0.0060 0.0002 
Median  0 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0008 0 9E-06 0.0013 -0.0008 
Max 0.0906 0.0315 0.0397 0.0862 0.2574 0.0533 0.1064 0.05959 
Min  -0.0930 -0.0584 -0.0289 -0.0079 -0.1075 -0.1033 -0.0337 -0.0556 
% > 0 48.84% 51.16% 39.53% 58.14% 48.84% 51.16% 65.12% 37.21% 
P value 0.6528 0.5156 0.5295 0.0009*** 0.0461 0.9413 0.0559 0.9501 
    Control Company    
ARt -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean 0.0041 -0.0107 0.0011 -0.0051 0.0042 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0012 
Median  0.0001 -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0029 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0009 
Max 0.1133 0.0146 0.0620 0.1967 0.3231 0.09287 0.1123 0.07421 
Min -0.0221 -0.1861 -0.0300 -0.0702 -0.1689 -0.0353 -0.1437 -0.0361 
% > 0 53.49% 30.23% 55.81% 25.58% 53.49% 48.84% 45.24% 40.48% 
P value 0.2253 0.0319** 0.6173 0.3830 0.6554 0.9115 0.9364 0.6204 
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Figure 2: Mean Weekly CARs for 3 Years Prior to, and One year Post Announcement 
 
 
As in the previous section, the different classifications of financial distress are treated 
separately. 
Figure 3: Mean CARs with respect to Profit Warning Announcements 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the average CAR of the 48 companies included in the distress sample 
due to a profit warning announcement. It is much closer to our expectations, in that the firms 
issuing a profit warning, on average, experience unusually poorer performance than do the 
matching control firms. This is indicated by the negative weekly CAR. However, this troughs 
at around -0.1 (-10%), and then increases to just above zero by the end of the testing period. 
This is again, due to the inclusion in the sample of surviving companies such as Briscoe 
Group Ltd, Telstra Ltd, Pharmacybrands Ltd, and Insured Group Ltd. 
By contrast in Figure 3, the average CAR of the control companies steadily increases, 
as they are never deemed to be financially distressed. 
In Figure 4 we turn to the CARs of the full subsample of firms associated with 
suspensions of trade. The results are again contrary to expectations in that we do not see a 
decline in the average CAR of the distressed samples over time. As with the previous graphs, 
this sample contains companies who have survived through momentary turbulence in trading 
and are still striving today.  On the other hand, Figure 4 excludes the effect of one chronically 
dysfunctional firm, Apple Fields Ltd, which had an outlying CAR of 7.022856 by t52 WKS. An 
investigation of Apple Fields data revealed that its share prices were at a record low in the 
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estimation period, trading on average, at $0.03 per share. By the test period, share prices rose 
to the average of $0.07 per share, which is double in value but still derisory in real terms. 
 
Figure 4: Average CARs with Respect to Suspension of Trade (But not Apple Fields Ltd) 
 
 
Overall, on average CARs over the span from three years prior to the disclosure date to 
one year after, it is clear the results remain inconclusive as various companies in the sample 
have bucked the expected trend. From the results, it is evident that the two identifiers of 
financial distress used in the study (i.e. a profit warning or a suspension of trade) are too 
vague; and that, as standard alerts, they are not precise enough. Hence it appears that investors 
tend to ignore them. On that note, we find, on the basis of the 71 distressed and matching 
control firms, H2. cannot be rejected. 
But what about the case in which a firm subsequently (and understood ex post) ceases 
to operate and is placed in liquidation or receivership?  We now narrow our focus to the eight 
firms within the distressed sample that irrefutably suffers financial distress.  Here H2 can 
clearly be rejected. 
 
Figure 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of ‘Bona Fide’ Distressed Companies  
 
 
Figure 5 shows that under this narrow definition of ‘financial distress’, the average 
CAR of the eight firms in the sample is as expected: negative and decreasing throughout the 
test period. From the graph it is clear that these firms experience negative abnormal returns 
consistently from two years beforehand until the firm ceases to trade.  This corroborates Frino 
et al., (2007) in that share prices usually reflect distress long before the official disclosure, and 
hence firms experience declining share prices beforehand.  In Frino et al’s case, this was over 
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a 425-day timeframe, in which the distinction between the negative CARs of failed firms and 
those in a control group became statistically significant at day t-200.  But their sample of 
distressed firms went on to become actual bankrupts. 
The result in Figure 5 also fits with the contention that the distortions and inconclusive 
results of the previous sections are caused by the abnormal returns behaviour of firms 
identified by bona fide distress diagnostics but not irretrievably in financial distress.  It would 
seem that investors, on average, can tell the difference between a firm that is heading for 
oblivion and one that is not, not only well in advance, but also irrespective of their formal 
announcement intimating distress. 
 
5.3.  Results concerning H3 
H3 states there is no significant relationship between share price behaviour and the magnitude 
of Altman’s Z statistic, measurable by the Kruskal-Wallis Test.  The sample size was reduced 
from 71 observations to 53 as a result of non-availability of data for computing the Z-scores 
of 18 firms.  The control firms dropped to 41 for the same reason.  The test could not used at 
all on the sample of distressed which subsequently were liquidated, as only two of these firms 
furnished appropriate general purpose financial report data.  Z-scores were summarized into 
three categories, where “1” was designated to represent a distress-level score, “2” covered the 
indeterminate range and “3” represented good health. 
Panel A of Table 7 shows no significant relationship between ARt0 and Z score class 
for the firms in the sample when distressed and control firms are combined.  This becomes 
less surprising when one notes that only nine of the control firms furnished most recently 
available Z-scores that were 3 (healthy) while ten of the distressed firms managed that feat.  
However, the Z-score appeared to perform strongly in associating itself with the abnormal 
returns generated by the sample of distress-disclosing firms (31 observations of 1 (distress) 12 
that were indeterminate (“2”) and 10 healthy as just mentioned).  In this distressed sample, the 
chi-squared value is 33.39 with a very small p-value (5.62E-08).  The control sample in its 
entirety yielded echoed this finding, but only at the 10 percent level of significance (Chi-
square = 5.2348 and p-value = 0.0730).  This result indicates that Z-scores do have some 
relevance in diagnosing company health, but they are not very good as forecasters of distress 
in the ensuing financial reporting period.  However, there turns out to be no distress-
announcement (by profit warning or suspension) connection between Z-scores and 
announcement-event abnormal returns. 
This forecasting capacity is even worse in terms of the relation between the Z scores 
and cumulative abnormal returns generated over the year leading up to the announcement in 
Panel B. Here there is no significant result for any category.  In Panel C, which measures the 
relation discernible for the year ending a full year before the distress disclosure, two weakly 
significant relations are detected, but the absence of significance in Panel B renders these 
Panel C results dubious. 
Consequently the only conclusion that can safely be drawn is that conventional 
distress-related announcements made to the NZX are noisy by nature, and do not have a 
significant relationship with the severity of financial distress.  
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Table 7:  Relation between CARs and Altman’s Z measured by the Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns (t0) and Z Score Class  
Sample Count Chi-squared P-value 
Full Sample 94 0.72 0.6966 
Distressed Firms only 53 33.3882 5.62E-08*** 
Control Firms Only 41 5.2348 0.0730* 
Distressed Firm Profit Warnings 44 1.5101 0.4670 
Distressed Firm Suspensions 9 1.3714 0.2416 
Panel B: CAR over Year 0 (tWKS -52 – tWKS -0) and Z Score Class 
Sample Count Chi-squared P-value 
Full Sample 94 0.2213 0.8952 
Control firms only 41 2.8049 0.2460 
Distressed Firm Profit Warnings 44 2.8083 0.2456 
Distressed Firm Suspensions 9 0.0857 0.7697 
Panel C: CAR over Year Negative 1 (tWKS -105 – tWKS -53) and Z Score Class 
Sample Count Chi-squared P-value 
Full Sample 94 0.8038 0.6691 
Distressed Firms Only 53 1.381339 0.5012 
Control Firms Only 41 5.2422 0.0727* 
Distressed Firm Profit Warnings 44 4.1538 0.1253 
Distressed Firm Suspensions 9 3.0857 0.0790* 
* Significant at the 10 percent level of a Type I error 
** Significant at the 5 percent level of a Type I error 
***Significant at the 1 percent level of a Type I error level 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The field of financial distress is an intriguing area of study and impacts on both the fields of 
finance and accounting. The primary aim of the paper was to see whether either of two types 
of financial distress-related announcement has any effect on the market value of shares, and in 
particular, test this assumption on listed New Zealand companies.  Prior literature tends to 
have suggested that although there are many compelling arguments against the timely 
disclosure of unfavourable news, the generally accepted stance is that prompt disclosures 
benefit the firms themselves and does not significantly affect the market. 
In this study, there has been little evidence of firms being unduly punished for making 
profit –warning announcements or for being suspended from trade.  The hypothesis H1, which 
posited that there would be no significant abnormal price reaction on the day of an 
announcement, could not be rejected.  However, when the set of firms that do go bankrupt is 
separated from those which go on to recover financially, it is clear that, for the former, no 
punishment is actually necessary.  This is because investors have already spent the best part of 
two years bidding their share prices down prior to the date the distress is disclosed.  The 
steadily deepening negative cumulative abnormal returns earned on the shares of these eight 
companies easily allows for the rejection of H2, which posited that no significant weekly 
cumulative abnormal returns would be discernible over the three-year period prior to the date 
of the distress disclosure. On the other hand, H2 could not be rejected on the far less clear-cut 
body of evidence provided by the set of “distressed” firms which went on to recover 
financially and survive. 
H3 could also not be rejected.  The relationship between Altman’s Z score and 
different measures of abnormal return turned out simply to be too weak . As mentioned, the 
sample included firms that did not go on to suffer the full severity of financial distress. This 
could be due to two reasons. The first is that the Altman’s Z score has a wide scope and 
captures incidences of distress (indicative by poor performance in any of its five ratios) that 
does not warrant the immediate attention of management. This would support Morris’ (1997) 
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claim that Altman’s Z index has a high type II error. The other possibility is that, in response 
to the stringency of listing rules, most companies NZX-listed companies tend to adopt a 
‘better safe than sorry’ approach, which entails their disclosing to the market any signs of 
financial turbulence, however temporary these might be.  If this is so, then the paper has 
included instances of companies showing weak signs of financial distress making a formal 
signal to the market for the sake of compliance.  It is, perhaps, like a regulatory 
encouragement for the little boy in the folk tale to go ahead and cry “Wolf!”  Investors have 
perhaps become accustomed to such disclosures and no longer react negatively to the news, 
discounting the effect of the warnings as part of the normal operations of the company – 
unless faced with further evidence that corroborate them.  Indeed the overall message is that 
formal announcements that might be seen as indicators of distress actually do not necessarily 
mean what they say, and are treated by investors accordingly. 
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